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COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKERS AND THE 
PROMOTION OF VALUES IN THE 
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 
SANFORD N. KATZ 
This article is based on a paper presented at the Illinois Welfare Asso- 
ciation Conference, Chicago, November 19, 1963. The author, an as- 
sociate professor of law at the Catholic University of America School 
of Law, Washington, B.C., is presently on leave as a United States 
Public Health Fellow at Yale Law School. 
We no longer think of the 
adoption of children as merely 
the juridical act creating cer- 
tain civil relations between people.1 It is 
really a social process2 by which a child 
becomes a member of another family. 
1 The definitions of "adoption of children" vary. 
"A juridical act creating between two persons cer- 
tain relations, purely civil, of paternity and filia- 
tion" (6 Demolombe's Code Napoleon 5 1). "Adop- 
tion is a means of creating the legal relation of 
parent and child between a child deprived of the 
care and protection of his own parents and the 
person wishing to take the child into his own home" 
(Emelyn Foster Peck, Adoption Laws in the United 
States, p. 1 [Children's Bureau Publication No. 148; 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1925]). "Adoption is the legal and social process 
by which the child of one pair of parents becomes 
the child of other parents" (Clyde Getz, "Adop- 
tion," Social Work Year Book, 1957, p. 82). "Adop- 
tion is the method provided by law of establishing 
the legal relationship of parent and child between 
persons who are not so related by birth, with the 
same mutual rights and obligations that exist 
between children and their natural parents" (Child 
Welfare League of America, Standards for Adop- 
tion Service [New York: The League, 1958], p. 1). 
"Adoption is a legal process, but also it is a very 
human affair" (Margaret Kornitzer, Adoption 
[London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959]). None of 
these definitions is wholly satisfactory. 
21 am using Professor McDougal's definition of 
social process. He defines it "in terms of partici- 
pants pursuing values by applying institutions 
to resources" (Myres S. McDougal, "Law as a 
Process of Decision: A Policy-oriented Approach 
to Legal Study," Natural Law Forum, I [1956], 
65). 
As a social process it involves a num- 
ber of community institutions. Each 
institution represents decision-makers 
who exert influence on one another. The 
ultimate decision-maker in an adoption 
is the judge. 
The judge must make a number of 
factual determinations. He must also 
make use of wide discretionary powers. 
He must consider such so-called guides 
as "the best interests of the child." He 
must interpret terms such as "good 
moral character," "proper persons to 
adopt," and "when practicable." How 
will a judge decide a dispute? How 
will he interpret these terms? 
It is not enough to say that a judge 
decides an adoption dispute by "looking 
up the rules of law" and then applying 
them to the facts of the case before 
him. In this field, the "rules" enunciated 
by a legislature through its adoption 
statute are really statements of com- 
munity preferences for certain policies. 
It is the application of these prefer- 
ences to the facts of the case that is 
the difficult job for a judge. It is at 
this point that a judge is influenced not 
only by his own set of values and his 
own preferences for a certain result but 
also by a number of institutions in the 
community and the values they in- 
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corporate.3 Governmental institutions, 
individual families, communication in- 
stitutions, health institutions, and re- 
ligious institutions have an impact on 
the decision he reaches in the case be- 
fore him. In this paper an attempt will 
be made to discuss the role of these 
institutions in the decision-making proc- 
ess as well as to present recommenda- 
tions for their future role. Also, there 
will be a discussion of the values that 
are promoted by some of these insti- 
tutions in the adoption process. 
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS 
Legislative and executive influence.? 
Governmental institutions at all levels 
have some impact on decision-making 
in an adoption case. These institutions 
include the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of the government, 
lawyers as officers of the court, admin- 
istrative tribunals, and federal, state, 
and local welfare agencies. 
Legislation gives adoption a legal 
base. There was no common law of adop- 
tion. In fact, Massachusetts was the 
first state to provide legal machinery 
to effectuate the adoption of a child.4 
In 1926, seventy-five years after the 
Massachusetts act was passed, England 
enacted its adoption statute.5 
Unlike the Roman law, in which the 
primary concern of adoption was the 
continuity of the adopter's family and 
in which emphasis was placed on in- 
heritance and succession,6 adoption 
legislation in the United States has 
been based primarily on the welfare of 
8 See Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. Mc- 
Dougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Pro- 
fessional Training in the Public Interest," Yale 
Law Journal, LII (March, 1943), 236. 
4 Mass. Laws 1851, p. 324. 
5 16 and 17 Geo. V, chap. 29; 17 Halsbury, Laws 
of England, S 1406-23 (2d ed., 1935). 
the child. Adoption has been a process 
of selecting fit parents for children, not 
finding children for parents. Until re- 
cent years there had been ten or more 
families making application to adopt 
for every child legally available for 
adoption.7 
Since the law of adoption is statu- 
tory, the major influence on a judge's 
decision is the adoption legislation it- 
self. It is his guide, and it reflects much 
of the prevalent adoption practice. 
Generally, adoption legislation has as 
its aim the protection of children by 
enunciating a policy of promoting their 
physical and emotional well-being. Also, 
it strives to be fair to his natural and 
adoptive parents by including pro- 
visions designed to protect their rights 
and interests. 
In drafting state legislation in this 
field, legislators are influenced by the 
views of interested local groups (e.g., 
public and private social welfare agen- 
cies, professional associations, and civic 
organizations). Also, they are affected 
by the recommendations of the federal 
government, most directly by the 
Children's Bureau of the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. In the adoption field the 
Children's Bureau has provided strong 
leadership recently by the publication 
of a manual entitled Legislative Guides 
for the Termination of Parental Rights 
6 See William W. Buckland and Arnold D. 
McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (Cam- 
bridge: The University Press, 1936), pp. 39-42. 
7 See Florence G. Brown, "Adoption," in Social 
Work Year Book, 1960, p. 85. Since the publication 
of that article, there is evidence that the trend has 
reversed. See Katharine B. Wheeler, "Meeting the 
Drop of Adoption Applications," Child Welfare, 
XLI (June, 1962), 270; John Matteford, "Decrease 
in Adoptive Applicants Related to Birth Rates," 
Child Welfare, XL (November, 1961), 30-31; and 
T. J. S. Waxter, "Drop in Adoptive AppUcants," 
Child Welfare, XL (September, 1961), 29. 
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and Responsibilities and the Adoption 
of Children? Certain provisions reflect- 
ing the policies mentioned above will 
be briefly discussed and criticized. 
A major contribution made by the 
Bureau in its suggested legislation is 
in the requirement that, in a non- 
relative adoption, the placement must 
be made by a licensed social service 
agency and that judicial proceeding to 
terminate the rights of the natural 
parents in the child must antedate the 
petition for adoption. The requirement 
of agency placements in non-relative 
adoptions has been controversial for 
many years.9 There are some who argue 
that it cannot be proved that children 
thrive better in a home chosen by an 
agency than in one chosen by private 
parties. There are too many variables, 
and the task of reaching any serious 
conclusion is, of course, difficult.10 
There are risks inherent in every 
adoption. Not only is the lessening of 
risks important in the requirement of 
agency placement, but also the oppor- 
tunity for regulation. Regulation makes 
possible the policing of those socially 
desired goals of adoption practice or 
those values in adoption which the en- 
lightened and interested members of 
the community seek to promote. 
8 U.S. Children's Bureau, Legislative Guides for 
the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsi- 
bilities and the Adoption of Children (Publication 
No. 394; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1961) (hereinafter referred to as "MTA" 
[Model Termination Act]). For a discussion of the 
guides, see Sanford N. Katz, "Judicial and Statu- 
tory Trends in the Law of Adoption," Georgetown 
Law Journal, LI (Fall, 1962), 64-95. 
9 See, e.g., Joseph H. Reid, "The Role of the 
Social Agency in Adoption," in "Adoptions: A 
Panel Discussion," Pediatrics, XX (August, 1957), 
369-72; Charles S. Stevenson, M.D., et al, "Current 
Problems in Child Adoption," Postgraduate Medi- 
cine, XXIV (November, 1958), 522-29. 
10 See Helen Witmer et al, Independent Adop- 
tions (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963). 
Involvement by the government 
through institutions, such as public 
child welfare agencies or by private in- 
stitutions through private agencies, is 
justified at the placement stage be- 
cause of the community^ proper con- 
cern for the child's well-being as well 
as that of the natural and adoptive 
parents. It is at this point that the com- 
munity's concern is most meaningful. 
The court-ordered social investigation 
that occurs in many states after the 
child has been in the adoptive parents' 
home for anywhere from six months to 
a year might be too late to be healthy 
for the child or fair to his parents. 
Agency placement at the beginning 
of the adoption process can, in the long 
run, lessen the likelihood of a child's 
being shifted from one home to another 
and then to a third. It can prevent 
hardships and disappointments that 
would result if a court determined that 
a child ought to be removed from a 
home in which the prospective adoptive 
parents, after having the child in their 
home for a relatively long period of 
time, had become fond of him. It can 
provide the most adequate protection 
for all the parties. 
The insistence in the Children's 
Bureau manual that termination of 
parental rights and responsibilities in 
the child precede the actual adoption 
and that the termination decree pro- 
vide for temporary guardianship and 
for legal custody of the child is worthy 
of consideration by the states. There 
are two good reasons in support of the 
procedure. Separate termination and 
adoption proceedings lessen the oppor- 
tunity for confusion of issues relevant 
to termination with issues pertinent to 
adoption. Also, the confusion of the 
child's status during the period from 
the natural parent's relinquishment or 
COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKERS IN THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 29 
release to the time of placement or the 
judicial decree of adoption (depending 
on the particular procedure used) is 
greatly diminished. Many agencies find 
that unless the child's status is clearly 
ascertainable when they obtain the 
child, their area of functioning is un- 
certain. They also find that the un- 
married mother who has decided to 
give up her child for adoption wants 
to be sure of the child's well-being 
as well as her own responsibilities or 
freedom from them. The belief in the 
field is that early voluntary termination 
helps toward clarity and ease of plan- 
ning for the child's life. 
Early involuntary termination of 
parental rights also can be most bene- 
ficial to the child. The Children's Bu- 
reau manual suggests that abandon- 
ment, substantial and continuous or re- 
peated neglect, incapacity to discharge 
parental responsibilities, or evidence 
that the presumptive parent is not a 
natural parent of the child be grounds 
for involuntary termination.11 The New 
York State Legislature has refined its 
neglect provision further, with the twin 
goals of promoting the child's well- 
being and being fair to the natural 
parents. In New York it was found that 
a great many children had become 
accustomed to foster care as a way of 
life. They had lost their opportunity for 
adoption because they had passed the 
age of "adoptability."12 In 19S9, the 
New York Legislature passed the 
"permanently neglected child" statute, 
"ii/TM, H(b). 
12 It has been found that it is more difficult 
to place children six years old and older than it is 
to place infants. Adjustments are more difficult 
for the older child than for the younger one. 
For a discussion about placement of older children, 
see Anne Leatherman, "Placing the Older Child 
in Adoption," Children, IV (May-June, 1957), 
107-12. 
which gives jurisdiction to the Chil- 
dren's Court to terminate parental 
rights in a proceeding brought by an 
agency having the child in its care. 
In order for an agency to be successful 
in its claim for custody with power to 
consent to the child's adoption, it must 
show that the child's parents have 
failed substantially and continuously 
for a year or more to maintain contact 
with him "although physically and 
financially able to do so" and "notwith- 
standing the diligent efforts of such 
agency to encourage and strengthen the 
parental relationship."13 
The Children's Bureau manual pro- 
vides that parental consent to an 
adoption must be written and ac- 
knowledged before an officer authorized 
to take acknowledgments and must be 
witnessed by a representative of a 
child-placement agency or of the court. 
These requirements of form are de- 
signed to impress upon the parent's 
mind the seriousness of the act she is 
performing and also minimize the op- 
portunities for fraud, coercion, and 
misunderstandings. Other states have 
similar provisions. For example, the 
new Illinois Adoption Act requires 
proper forms and methods of execu- 
tion and acknowledgment14 and con- 
tains the prohibitition against imme- 
diate consent or surrender of the child. 
But these safeguards are empty un- 
less agencies follow them honestly and 
to the letter as well as in the spirit of 
the act. If this were done, cases like 
the recent Karr v. Weihe15 would not 
arise. In that case, a natural mother 
brought a writ of habeas corpus to 
recover custody of her infant son from 
13N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, chap. 449, S 2(24). 
14 111. Rev. Stat., chap. 4, 5 9.1-10 (1959). 
15 30 111. App. 2d 361, 174 N.E. 2d 897 (1961). 
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a private Illinois child welfare agency. 
The agency had received custody of the 
child four days after his birth by vir- 
tue of purported surrenders and con- 
sents executed by both natural parents 
about ninety-six hours after the birth 
of the child. The mother claimed that 
her surrender and consent were given to 
the agency through fraud and duress. 
She maintained that at the time she 
signed the documents she was under 
the influence of drugs, was emotionally 
troubled, was misinformed about the 
nature and effect of the documents, and 
was fraudulently induced to sign the 
papers by her husband, who had mis- 
represented certain facts to her. 
According to the opinion of the Illi- 
nois appellate court, the natural mother 
had been acting under the mistaken 
belief that her surrender of her child 
to the child welfare agency was only 
temporary and that she could get her 
baby back within a year. The repre- 
sentative of the child welfare agency 
who obtained the parents' consents 
knew of these misunderstandings yet 
did nothing at the time of the signing 
of the forms to dispel them. In granting 
relief to the natural mother, the court 
emphasized the duty to inform her of 
the nature of the acts she was perform- 
ing. The absence of information about 
the surrender and consent was tanta- 
mount to deception and fraud, making 
her actions revocable. 
Lawyers.?If we take seriously what 
Sophonisba Breckinridge wrote almost 
thirty years ago, lawyers would play an 
insignificant role in the adoption 
process, and their influence on a judge 
would be minimal. Miss Breckinridge 
asked whether adoption of children was 
"a truly judicial procedure"16 ?i.e., a 
procedure to decide a dispute. She 
thought that no adoption should result 
if there was a dispute. Once the issue 
of the competence of the natural par- 
ents was settled, she considered the 
completion of an adoption a simple 
ministerial act. 
Her idea was not far from what in 
fact was the practice in the early part 
of this century in some southern states 
as well as in Texas, Iowa, and Penn- 
sylvania.17 Save for Miss Breckinridge's 
important qualification of a "sound and 
thorough social inquiry" before trans- 
fer of custody of a child from his 
natural parents to his adoptive parents, 
adoption procedures in those states 
were very much like the formalities 
of a real-estate transfer. 
Perhaps it is appropriate today to 
study what meaningful part the lawyer 
can perform in the adoption process. 
His role in divorce problems has been 
challenged by a lawyer who has stated: 
I see no reason why social workers could 
not handle any potential divorce proceedings 
by investigating the persons involved and mak- 
ing a considered recommendation to the court. 
Any financial settlements that had to be 
reached could be handled by lawyers and the 
unhappy situation resolved in a civilized man- 
ner.18 
Similarly, a number of writers have 
minimized the role of the lawyer in 
the adoption process. They have rele- 
gated the lawyer to performing two 
tasks: counseling and completing 
forms.19 However, these are only a part 
16 Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, The Family and 
the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1934), p. 356. 
17 See Peck, op. cit., cited in Breckinridge, op. cit., 
p. 358. 
"New York Times, October 9, 1963, p. 37C. 
Samuel G. Kling, author of The Complete Guide 
to Divorce (New York: Random House, 1963), 
is the source of the quotation. 
19 See Ursula M. Gallagher, "Interprofessional 
Teamwork To Safeguard Adoptions," Children, VI 
(May-June, 1959), 101-4. 
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of his job and the least complex at 
that. 
In order to answer the question about 
the role of the lawyer in the adoption 
process, another question must be 
posed: In what arena is the lawyer 
functioning? The lawyer may be in- 
volved in the adoption process at vari- 
ous stages. Prospective adoptive parents 
may call upon him to locate a child 
for them, or an unmarried mother 
may request that he arrange a proper 
adoption. Many writers have cautioned 
him about his responsibilities in these 
situations.20 
When there are competing claims 
for the rights to the custody, control, 
and company of a child, the lawyer's 
role is that of direct participant in the 
judicial process. He is in his familiar 
arena?an adversary proceeding in 
court. He represents his client's in- 
terests by persuading the judge that 
the kind of disposition of the case for 
which he argues is the proper one. As 
counsel for the natural mother, he may 
be attempting to show that her consent 
was obtained through fraud. As counsel 
for the natural father, he may be at- 
tempting to prove the necessity for the 
father's consent, which the father has 
not given and will not give. As counsel 
for hopeful parents, he may be attempt- 
ing to challenge an agency's rejection 
of the couple. As counsel for the agency, 
he may defend the decision to reject 
an applicant. 
Perhaps a lawyer ought to have a 
role to play as counsel for the child in 
an adoption proceeding. He would be 
20 See, e.g., Alex Elson and Miriam Elson, 
"Lawyers and Adoptions: The Lawyer's Respon- 
sibility in Perspective," American Bar Association 
Journal, XLI (December, 1955), 1125-28 ff.; Alex 
Elson, "The Legal Profession's Responsibility in 
Adoption," Child Welfare, XXXV (March, 1956), 
21-24; Gallagher, "Interprofessional Teamwork 
.. .," op. cit. 
the protector of the child's rights as 
well as of his general welfare. He would 
have the authority to make independent 
investigations and to prepare his own 
records by making use of psychiatric 
and social service evalutions apart from 
agency reports. He would represent the 
child in court much like a guardian ad 
litem. 
Little thought has been given to the 
fact that, while the child is the central 
figure in an adoption case with his 
best interests as the guide for the 
judge's decision, he is not entitled to 
notice of the proceedings,21 nor are his 
wishes necessarily made known or con- 
sidered by the court,22 nor is he repre- 
sented by counsel. Presumably the 
judge is supposed to look out for the 
child's best interests. His is the role 
of the "wise parent." But how can we 
expect a judge to be a dispassionate, 
objective observer and decision-maker 
on the one hand and subjective coun- 
selor to the child on the other?23 This 
21 See Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 111. 536, 36 N.E. 
628 (1893); Gibson, Appellant, 154 Mass. 378 
(1891). 
22 Note what Judge Black of the Michigan Su- 
preme Court stated in his dissent in a case concern- 
ing the termination of the natural parent's rights 
and responsibilities in her child: "[The judges 
in the majority] do not even consult the wishes 
and attachments of the child, and seem not to 
realize that children too have rights; rights that 
are?or at least should be?paramount when there 
is a conflict thereof with parental rights" (In re 
Mathers, 124 N.W. 2d 878 [1963]). 
231 am asking essentially the same question posed 
by Mr. Justice Sutherland, although his remarks 
refer to an accused in a criminal proceeding: "But 
how can a judge, whose functions are purely judi- 
cial, effectively discharge the obligations of counsel 
for the accused? He can and should see to it that 
in the proceedings before the Court the accused 
shall be dealt with justly and fairly. He cannot 
investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, 
or participate in those necessary conferences be- 
tween counsel and accused which sometimes par- 
take of the inviolable character of the confessional" 
(Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 [1932]; see 
also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510 [1962]). 
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is what we are asking of him when we 
say that special legal representation 
for a child would be an intrusion into 
the judicial function. 
There is precedent for appointing 
counsel for children.24 In fact, a much 
stronger case can be made for estab- 
lishing the position of attorney for the 
child in an adoption proceeding than 
for having counsel in juvenile-court 
proceedings. For years, a battle has 
been waged over the question whether 
there is a right to counsel in the 
juvenile court. Pitted against the notion 
that even though, within those provi- 
sions of the Constitution which prescribe 
certain standards and procedures for 
criminal proceedings, the juvenile court 
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, 
is the fact that an individual's rights 
and liberties are at stake and, an argu- 
ment runs, these rights should be pro- 
tected in the same manner as practiced 
in adult criminal courts. However, as- 
suming the right to counsel is essential, 
there is some question about whether 
the lawyer's appearance will detract 
from the informality of the proceedings 
and thus whether his participation will 
conflict with the philosophy under- 
lying the establishment of the court. 
These problems are still being debated 
even though the child's right to coun- 
sel is almost an established fact.25 But 
an adoption proceeding is neither 
241 am omitting references to appointment of 
counsel for incompetents in incompetency proceed- 
ings, but an analogy to that precedent would be 
relevant. See Frank T. Lindman and Donald M. 
Mclntyre, Jr. (eds.), The Mentally Disabled and 
the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1961), p. 29. 
25 See Orman W. Ketcham, "The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the American Juvenile Court"; Paul 
W. Alexander, "Constitutional Rights in the Juve- 
nile Court"; and Alex Elson, "Juvenile Courts and 
Due Process," in Justice for the Child, ed. Margaret 
Keeney Rosenheim (New York: Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1962), pp. 22-43, 82-94, 95-117. 
criminal, nor quasi-criminal, nor in- 
formal. It is, as stated previously, a 
traditional adversary proceeding, and a 
counsel for the child would in no way 
clash with the method or form of the 
litigation. 
There are family courts that allow 
counsel for children in neglect and de- 
linquency proceedings. For example, 
the New York Legislature found that 
"counsel is often indispensable to a 
practical realization of due process of 
law and may be helpful in making rea- 
soned determination of fact and proper 
orders of disposition."26 To realize 
these purposes the New York Family 
Court Act established a system of "law 
guardians." While the text of the act 
does not fully explain the duties of a 
"law guardian," it does state that a 
" 
'law guardian' refers to an attorney 
. . . to represent minors."27 Presumably 
he will act not only as an advocate but, 
because of the label "guardian," as one 
responsible for his client's general wel- 
fare. That is to say, his duties go be- 
yond carrying out the wishes of his cli- 
ent, the child, but include looking out 
for his over-all interests. For example, 
if counsel thought it wise and in the in- 
terest of the child, he might have to 
disclose information to the court which 
the child might not wish revealed. Also, 
since the act sets up the administrative 
machinery for providing the "law 
guardian" (e.g., by utilizing the person- 
nel of a local legal aid society, individu- 
26 New York Family Court Act, 5 241. For a 
discussion of the act and the role of the lawyer, 
see Monrad G. Paulsen, "The New York Family 
Court Act," Buffalo Law Review, XII (June, 1963), 
420-41; Jacob L. Isaacs, "The Role of the Lawyer 
in Representing Minors in the New Family Court," 
Buffalo Law Review, XII (June, 1963), 501-21; 
Nanette Dembitz, "Ferment and Experiment in 
New York," Cornell Law Quarterly, XLVIII 
(Spring, 1963), 510-11. 
27 New York Family Court Act, S 242. 
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al attorneys, etc.28) and for his com- 
pensation,29 he takes on the mantle of a 
court-appointed official. 
Precedent aside, given that an adop- 
tion proceeding is an adversary pro- 
ceeding, counsel for the child can help 
in the orderly administration of the 
family law process. As an advocate, 
guardian, officer of the court, or what- 
ever he is labeled, the lawyer can pro- 
vide the judge with an important and 
useful source of information?the 
child's views and an expression of his 
feelings. These may not necessarily be 
in conflict with the position of other in- 
terested parties, but they would be 
available, and certainly they are rele- 
vant and important. Although it is not 
always feasible to police the adoption 
process as early as the placement stage, 
in spite of the fact that early scrutiny 
might alleviate many present and fu- 
ture hardships, something can be done 
to assure the maximum presentation of 
all the facts in the court proceeding. If 
athe best interests of the child" are to 
be sought, certainly the child should be 
consulted; and this should be done in 
a formal and regular manner. 
In the absence of counsel a child 
might have to act as his own attorney. 
That is, in effect, what a fourteen-year- 
old boy did in his own adoption pro- 
ceeding. In that case,30 the natural 
father attempted to bar the adoption of 
his son by his sister and brother-in-law 
by withholding his consent, which he 
argued was necesary to effectuate the 
adoption. The child had lived apart 
from his natural parents almost his en- 
tire life. He had become fully inte- 
grated into the family of his aunt and 
uncle. The judge approved the adop- 
b Ibid., I 243. "Ibid., S 245. 
30 In re Jacques, 48 NJ. Super. 523, 138 A. 2d 
581 (1958). 
tion. It is valuable to note what the 
judge wrote in his opinion: 
The child has regarded and refers to plain- 
tiffs as mother and father and accords them 
the admiration, obedience, love and devotion 
of a son. It is the child's expressed desire to 
be adopted by the plaintiffs and to be person- 
ally known as Robert Dickinson Jacques. This 
he has made known to his natural father. The 
situation which distresses the father most is 
the child's willingness to have his name 
changed. The father's attitude in this respect 
has so disturbed the child that from the wit- 
ness stand he expressed a wish that the court 
make a decision for him. 
The adoptive child persisted in his desire to 
be adopted, even though subject to proper vig- 
orous cross-examination concerning the legal 
and moral effect of permitting the adoption. 
The boy's testimony and the report of the 
State Board of Child Welfare . . . indicates 
his understanding and desire with respect to 
these proceedings. 
There could be no doubt in any one's mind 
that the adoptive child is above average intel- 
ligence for one his age and that he has at- 
tained that ripened discretion which enables 
him to determine what his own interests and 
welfare demands, and that he possesses the im- 
partial acumen necessary to make an accurate 
appraisal of the facts surrounding the proceed- 
ings.31 
It seems that the judge was struck 
by the child's behavior on the stand. 
Would not the child have been spared 
what must have been a serious emo- 
tional experience in the courtroom by 
having a personal legal representative? 
Without counsel a child can lack pro- 
tection from agency policies and deci- 
sions. Agencies may believe they are rep- 
resenting children in their custody as a 
lawyer would. Sometimes, however, 
what they consider to be in the best 
interests of the child may be clouded 
by their concern for the best interests 
of the agency. Someone should be avail- 
able to protect the child's interests. 
That person should be free from con- 
81 Ibid., at 531; 138 A. 2d 585. 
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cerns for administrative regularity, con- 
flicts, and precedents for political re- 
percussions. 
Note what happened in In re Jewish 
Child Care Association?2 In that case a 
writ of habeas corpus was brought by 
an agency to obtain a child from foster 
parents with whom it had placed the 
child. The child had lived with the fos- 
ter parents for almost her entire life. 
When the foster parents refused to give 
up the child, the agency brought the 
suit. 
During the first year of the foster- 
home arrangement the foster parents 
had expressed a desire to adopt the 
child but had been told that theirs was 
a boarding home and that adoption was 
out of the question. Three years later, 
they were asked to sign a paper to the 
effect that the child had been placed 
with them for boarding purposes only. 
The foster parents persisted in their de- 
sire to adopt the child but were repeat- 
edly told that they could not do so. Yet 
the child had remained with them for 
four and one-half of her five years of 
life. There was nothing in the court's 
opinion to indicate that the child's natu- 
ral mother cared for the child or had 
any interest in her. 
The agency wanted the child removed 
from the home of the foster parents. 
Even though the agency stated that the 
foster parents were well qualified in 
every respect, had taken good care of 
the child, and were providing her with 
an excellent home environment, it 
thought that they had become too at- 
tached to the child and that a conflict 
could arise between the child's loyalty 
to her natural parent and to her foster 
parents. It wanted to place the child in 
what it called a "neutral environment." 
The New York Court of Appeals with 
32 5 N.Y. 2d 222, 156 N.E. 2d 700 (1959). 
three judges dissenting affirmed the de- 
cision of the lower court. It held that 
the trial justice had not abused its dis- 
cretion in deciding to remove the child 
from the home of the foster parents. 
Chief Judge Conway, writing for the 
majority of the court, stated: 
That the Sanders have given Laura a good 
home and have shown her great love does not 
stamp as an abuse of discretion the Trial Jus- 
tice's determination to take her from them. 
Indeed, it is the extreme of love, affection and 
possessiveness manifested by the Sanders, to- 
gether with the conduct which their emotional 
involvement impelled, that supplies the foun- 
dation of reasonableness and correctness for 
his determination. The vital fact is that Mr. 
and Mrs. Sanders are not, and presumably will 
never be, Laura's parents by adoption. 
We are, of course, not unmindful that the 
result we reach may cause distress to the ap- 
pellants. However, the most important con- 
sideration of the child's best interests, the 
recognition and preservation of her mother's 
primary love and custodial interest, and the 
future life of the mother and child together, 
are paramount.33 
We may differ over Judge Conway's 
analysis of what was the "vital fact" in 
the case, or we may argue about what 
Laura's best interests were. Were they, 
as the majority of the court would lead 
us to believe, the removal of the child 
from what admittedly was a happy 
home life, where the child was a member 
of a family, to an unknown placement? 
The dissent was opposed to this solu- 
tion. It called the result tragic and said: 
[It came about] because of the mistaken 
notion that the courts are bound to accept 
an administrative policy of the Agency as 
controlling their determination rather than 
to exercise their own traditional power and 
authority in accordance with the evidence. 
While administrative practices have a useful 
place in the handling of ordinary matters of 
administration, such test is wholly inappro- 
priate in this setting. Here we are not dealing 
^Ibid., at 229, 230; 156 N.E. 2d, at 703, 704. 
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with routine problem of administration, but 
rather with the fundamental concept under- 
lying the broad and enlightened social wel- 
fare program of the State respecting the care 
and custody of indigent and neglected children, 
every aspect of which is to be tested in the 
light of which will best promote their indi- 
vidual welfare.34 
What is important and missing in the 
opinion is an expression of the child's 
feelings, how she perceived the situa- 
tion, and what her desires were. Perhaps 
a lawyer could have brought these fac- 
tors to the court's attention. 
The lawyer's role in the adoption 
process should not be minimized or con- 
fined to office practice. The lawyer is 
the protector of the individual's rights. 
In the cases referred to, there were jus- 
ticiable issues with important effects on 
the interests, well-being, and expecta- 
tions of many people. In our society 
such disputes have been assigned for de- 
cision to the court, with its tradition of 
fair procedures, its sanctions, and the 
respect afforded it by the community. 
Child welfare agencies.?Child wel- 
fare agencies have been the traditional 
investigative arm of the court, and their 
influence on the judge has been direct 
and profound. In recent years it has 
been the practice in many American 
jurisdictions, before an adoption is de- 
creed, to provide the court with a study 
of the child, his natural parents, and his 
adoptive parents. Whether the study is 
mandatory or discretionary varies ac- 
cording to the particular state.35 
The court-ordered social investiga- 
tion is crucially important to the judge. 
It has a recommending function. Note 
the language of the Illinois statute: 
The court shall appoint an agency or a 
person deemed competent by the court to 
investigate accurately, fully, and promptly, 
the allegations contained in the petition; the 
3(1 Ibid., at 230-31; 156 N.E. 2d, at 704. 
character, reputation, and general standing in 
the community of the petitioners; the religious 
faith of the petitioners and, if ascertainable, 
of the child sought to be adopted; and 
whether the petitioners are proper persons 
to adopt the child and whether the child is 
a proper subject of adoption.36 
In order to determine "whether the 
petitioners are proper persons to adopt 
the child and whether the child is a 
proper subject of adoption," the social 
worker has to make a number of judg- 
ments and predictions. He must be con- 
cerned with whether the proposed adop- 
tive parents will be satisfactory not 
only immediately but for the total span 
of childhood years and thereafter. This 
is the same question with which the 
caseworker must be faced at the place- 
ment stage. As David Fanshel has 
stated, "the caseworker must select 
couples who would appear to have the 
ingredients necessary for good perform- 
ance with the child not only as an in- 
fant, but also when he becomes a tod- 
dler, a preschooler, a ten-year-old, an 
35 E.g., in New York (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
SS 112[5], 113, 115-a[3], 116[2]-[3]) and Illinois 
(111. Rev. Stat, chap. 4, S 9.1-6 [1961]) it is 
mandatory, while in Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. 
I 1269-05 [1956]) and Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. 
S 127.210[4] [1959]) it is discretionary. The Dis- 
trict of Columbia makes the investigation manda- 
tory unless the petitioner is a spouse of a natural 
parent of the adoptee, which natural parent con- 
sents to the adoption or joins in the adoption 
petition, in which case the investigation is dis- 
cretionary (D.C. Code Ann. H6-216 [1961]). 
Other jurisdictions treat this problem in still dif- 
ferent ways. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code, Art. 16, 5 76 
(1957)?mandatory except when the court "has 
such intimate and personal knowledge of the facts 
and circumstances" as to render an investigation 
unnecessary. 
36 111. Rev. Stat., chap. 4, 5 9.1-6 (1959). The 
Virginia statute is more explicit about the function 
of its court-ordered social investigation. After a 
statement about the contents of the investigation 
report, the statute reads: "In making his report 
the Commissioner shall also include his recom- 
mendation as to the action to be taken by the 
court on the petition" (Va. Stat. Ann., chap. 14, 
S 63-349 [1949]). 
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adolescent, etc."37 In other words, the 
adoptive applicant is selected to do the 
"job" of parent and, hopefully, that of 
a good parent.38 
What are these "ingredients neces- 
sary for good performance with the 
child"? What factors are important to 
the caseworker in his evaluation of the 
adoptive parents? Generally speaking, 
there are similar concerns for writing a 
social investigation for the court as 
there are for agencies selecting adop- 
tive parents at the placement stage. 
Writing about the breadth of knowl- 
edge necessary for good social work 
practice, Alfred Kadushin chose a par- 
ticular problem: the screening interview 
of an adoptive applicant in a public 
welfare agency. The following quota- 
tion illustrates what Kadushin believes 
are some evaluating factors: 
In order to offer effective services the 
worker needs to know the agency regulations 
regarding age, fertility examinations, and 
health conditions of applicants. . . . She 
needs to know the desirable physical condi- 
tions of a good adoptive home, of a good 
adoptive neighborhood. She needs to know 
and understand something about the optimum 
age differential between adoptive parents and 
the child. . . . She needs to know: the diag- 
nostic significance of information regarding 
the applicants' developmental history, work 
history, health history, the history and cur- 
rent functioning of the marriage; the clients, 
conceptions of parenthood, expectations as 
to rewards and deprivations of parenthood, 
expectations about the child they hope to 
adopt, and their age, sex, nationality, and 
class preferences in relation to the child 
they hope to adopt.39 
37 David Fanshel, "Approaches to Measuring 
Adjustment in Adoptive Parents," in Quantitative 
Approaches to Parent Selection (New York: Child 
Welfare League of America, 1962), pp. 18-35. 
38 See Alfred Kadushin, "A Study of Adoptive 
Parents of Hard-To-Place Children," Social Case- 
work, XLIII (May, 1962), 227-33. Kadushin's con- 
ceptualization of the selection process for adoptive 
applicants is much like an analysis of occupational 
choice. 
Is there not a presupposition of a sys- 
tem of values underlying Kadushin's 
remarks about the screening interview? 
One can detect the concern for such 
values as welfare, wealth, affection, re- 
spectability, and enlightenment. 
Yet social workers do not speak in 
terms of values. To them the process of 
selecting adoptive parents involves the 
use of "standards" and "qualifications." 
In discussing how the availability of 
children affects the selecting process, 
Kadushin has written: 
The agency will maintain ideal standards 
as long as the supply of fully qualified appli- 
cants who are ready to become adoptive 
parents exceeds the supply of children. When 
the number of children exceeds the number 
of fully qualified applicants, the agency will 
lower its qualifications for adoptive parents. 
The first modification in standards is likely 
to be made in qualifications having little or 
no functional importance for the effective 
performance of the ^05^10^ of adoptive 
parent. Religion, in this sense, is a non- 
functional qualification for parenthood.40 One 
can effectively discharge the functions of 
parenthood as either a Protestant or an ag- 
nostic. Emotional stability, however, is a 
functional qualification. Hence the adoption 
agency is likely to be more willing to accept 
39 Alfred Kadushin, "The Knowledge Base of 
Social Work," in Issues in American Social Work, 
ed. Alfred J. Kahn (New York: Columbia Univer- 
sity Press, 1959), pp. 44-45. 
40 But compare this with what Father Bowers 
has written: "[We] do not look at religion merely 
in terms of the values that it may hold for this or 
that individual, but as a basic and fundamental 
obligation that falls upon man as a created being, 
upon every man. Religion is a duty incumbent 
upon man as man, irrespective of the values that 
may accrue to him from it. As we consider the 
role of religion in the life of the child and its im- 
portance in evaluating adoption homes, it will be 
essential to remember that from the Catholic view- 
point religion is something more than a value to 
the child. It is also an obligation basic to his very 
nature" (Swithun Bowers, "The Child's Heritage: 
From a Catholic Point of View," in A Study of 
Adoption Practice, II, ed. Michael Schapiro [New 
York: Child Welfare League of America, 1956], 
130-33). 
COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKERS IN THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 37 
a couple with different religious backgrounds 
than it is to accept an emotionally unstable 
couple.41 
To illustrate how a judge is impressed 
with using the values suggested by 
Kadushin to determine a proper set of 
adoptive parents, In re Jacques*2 is rel- 
evant. The judge wrote this about the 
parents: 
The home of the plaintiffs is more than 
modest and adequate. It is situated in a 
very pleasant residential section and is with- 
in walking distance of schools and church. 
There is no question of the financial ability 
of the plaintiffs to provide in a proper 
fashion, not only for their own three chil- 
dren, but for the child sought to be adopted 
as well.43 
It has been shown beyond doubt that 
plaintiffs are capable, conscientious, of fine 
character, maintain a fine home, are solicitous 
of the welfare of the child sought to be 
adopted, and would make excellent parents, 
and are good, clean, wholesome, God-fearing 
Christian people with a real genuine parental 
affection for the young man.44 
There has been a great deal of dis- 
cussion about the values promoted by 
social agencies in their placement prac- 
tices.45 It is unfair, however, to cate- 
gorically indict all agencies for the rig- 
idity of a few or to suggest that there 
is a fixed hierarchy of values that are 
promoted through agency practices.46 
As Kadushin pointed out, economics 
plays an important part in the formula- 
41 See Kadushin, "A Study of Adoptive Parents 
. . . ," op. cit., p. 231. 
42 48 NJ. Super 523, 138 A. 2d 581 (1958). 
43 Ibid., at 530, 138 A. 2d, at 584. 
44 Ibid., at 532, 138 A. 2d, at 586. 
45 See, e.g., Joseph H. Reid, "Principles, Values, 
and Assumptions Underlying Adoption Practice," 
in Readings in Adoption, ed. I. Evelyn Smith (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1963), pp. 26-37. 
48 For such an indictment, see Rael Jean Isaac, 
"Children Who Need Adoption: A Radical View," 
Atlantic Monthly, CCXII (November, 1963), 45- 
50. 
tion of "standards" for selecting par- 
ents. Another factor that is taken into 
account is the particular kind of child 
available for adoption. Children with 
special needs (e.g., the physically hand- 
icapped, minority-group children, older 
children) demand special parents, and 
certain values are preferred over others 
in selecting these parents. 
COMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS 
Mass communication helps enlighten 
the community. If the climate is right, 
it can change attitudes, it can persuade, 
it can mold public opinion.47 While it 
may not necessarily or directly control 
outcomes in a particular dispute, its 
persuasive powers can rally community 
support for a given result. In this way 
the communications institutions affect 
community decision-makers. 
It is not uncommon for the press to 
interest itself in custody and adoption 
disputes and to exert pressure on social 
welfare agencies to allow a child to re- 
main with a couple who want to adopt 
him, when the welfare agency, for rea- 
sons it will not reveal, wants to remove 
the child.48 A recent case which received 
publicity concerned an attempt by a 
New Jersey welfare agency to remove 
a four-year-old girl from the home of 
her foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. Combs, 
who wanted to adopt her. From the 
press reports it seemed that the decisive 
factor in the case was that Alice Marie, 
47 See, e.g., Wilbur L. Schramm (ed.), The Proc- 
ess and Effects of Mass Communication (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1954), pp. 209-14; 
Eugene L. Hartley et al, "Attitudes and Opinions," 
ibid., pp. 216-50; Joseph T. Klapper, "Mass Media 
and Persuasion," ibid., pp. 289-320; Wilbur L. 
Schramm, Responsibility in Mass Communication 
(New York: Harper 4 Bros., 1957). 
48 For an interesting account of a disputed adop- 
tion case and the role of the press in the contro- 
versy, see Alton A. Linford, "The Miller Adoption 
Case," Social Service Review, XXXIV (December, 
1960), 421-42. 
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a child with an IQ of 138, was too bril- 
liant for her foster parents. Mr. Combs 
earned 3119 a week as a sheet-metal- 
worker, and the Combs lived in a home 
awithout books" ?a home in which the 
television set was the center of the 
family's intellectual activities. It was 
thought that the foster parents could 
not give Alice Marie enough intellectu- 
al stimulation. According to the welfare 
department's report, the foster parents 
were "below average to average cultural 
level," with high-school education.49 
Because they could make no adminis- 
trative appeal from the department's 
decision, the foster parents took their 
appeal to the Appellate Division of the 
New Jersey Superior Court. The case 
was dismissed because the foster par- 
ents were not the child's blood relatives 
and therefore were not proper parties 
to the action. Mrs. Combs had notified 
the press about the dispute. Newspaper 
captions give the history of the case: 
"Foster Parents and State Battle for 
Bright Girl of 4," "Welfare Agency 
Bows To Let Couple Keep Girl," "Cou- 
ple Win Adoption of Trodigy' 4."50 Ac- 
cording to the last article, the welfare 
department changed its decision to re- 
move Alice Marie and prevent the 
adoption because it thought that its 
previous decision would not have been 
"in the best interests of the child." 
The case is interesting for two rea- 
sons. It points up how effective the 
press was in its monopoly position for 
persuasion as contrasted with the inef- 
fectuality of the welfare department. 
More important is the content of the 
49 For a fuller version of the facts and the history 
of the case, see New Jersey Legislature, Joint Wel- 
fare Investigating Committee, Child Welfare in 
New Jersey (Trenton, 1961), pp. 55-61. 
60 Washington Post, March 9,1960, p. C6; March 
16, 1960, p. A3; April 1, 1960, p. A3. 
press reports. The focus of the reports 
was on the welfare department's em- 
phasis on "enlightenment," suggesting 
that "affection" was less important. In 
fact, the New York Times titled its re- 
port: "Parents Plead Love in Bright- 
Girl Case."51 This is an appealing ap- 
proach for purposes of community iden- 
tification and support. Probably it 
would have had the same attraction and 
support had the case involved foster 
parents whom the welfare department 
considered "too poor" for adoptive par- 
enthood. For the welfare department 
not to accept for adoptive parenthood a 
couple not intellectually keen or not 
economically affluent is an indictment 
against a large number of community 
parents. 
In the long run, welfare agency poli- 
cies are dependent upon community 
suppport, and compliance with any par- 
ticular decision is affected by commu- 
nity attitudes. In competing with the 
press for support for its decision in a 
dispute like the one under discussion, 
welfare agencies are at a disadvantage. 
Because of confidentiality, the agencies 
are unable to disclose to the community 
all the facts of a particular case. What 
is available to the agencies is the op- 
portunity through a continuous and sus- 
tained program to explain and seek 
community acceptance of their policies 
and programs. In fact, a mandate is 
given them by the Child Welfare 
League of America Standards for Adop- 
tion Service: 
It is necessary to obtain public interest, 
understanding and support for development of 
the required resources, adequate financing, 
effective legislation and maintenance of 
standards. 
The public should be informed of the 
services and safeguards which the unmarried 
51 New York Times, March 9, 1960, pp. 1, 27. 
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mother and other parents, the child and the 
adoptive parents need, and which are offered 
only by social agencies. 
Efforts should be made to change com- 
munity attitudes and to help the public under- 
stand the facts.52 
At the same time, it is important that 
the mass media become aware of their 
responsibilities. They can perform the 
useful function of watchdog for ques- 
tionable agency policies and practices. 
However, when they seize upon only 
one aspect of a case, as has been illus- 
trated, this might be to the detriment 
of the personal interests of the individ- 
uals. Because of the important role 
communications institutions can play in 
the adoption process, their understand- 
ing of the problems is important. If 
they are to pass judgment, either di- 
rectly or indirectly, on the actions of 
other community decision-makers, they 
must be as enlightened as the other de- 
cision-makers. This means that they 
need to understand all the facts. Short 
of this, they should show a certain 
amount of restraint. 
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS 
Just as the determination of the law- 
yer's role in the adoption process de- 
pends on the arena in which he works 
or the person or agency that he repre- 
sents, the role of the physician is de- 
pendent on the identity of his patient 
and his base of operations.53 Regardless 
of his base, however, he tries to advance 
values of health and well-being. He acts 
as a decision-maker and as an influence 
52 Child Welfare League of America, op. cit., pp. 
56-57. 
63 See Ernest H. Watson, M.D., "The Physician 
and the Adoption of Children," Journal of the 
Michigan State Medical Society, LVI (March, 
1957), 342-44; Morris A. Wessel, M.D., "The Pedi- 
atrician and Adoption," New England Journal of 
Medicine, CCLXII (March 3, 1960), 446-50. 
upon other decision-makers in the com- 
munity. 
The obstetrician may suggest adop- 
tion of a child to a couple unable to 
have children of their own. He may be 
the first to discover that an unmarried 
woman is pregnant and may influence 
her in her decision regarding the child's 
future. The family physician, whatever 
his specialty, may be instrumental in 
the arrangement of a private adoption. 
The pediatrician who examines a 
child about to be adopted may find it 
is defective or diseased, and his prog- 
nosis may impede an adoption. On the 
other hand, because of a defect in a 
child, a parent may be prompted 
through the recommendation of a pedi- 
atrician to give the child up for adop- 
tion. 
Likewise, the psychiatrist may influ- 
ence the decisions of childless couples 
to adopt a child, or of an unmarried 
mother to keep her child or give her 
child for adoption. His report to an 
agency or to the court may influence 
the decisions of the agency or the court. 
Any of these physicians may act in 
private consultation or in an agency set- 
ting as part of an agency team. One 
writer has recommended that pediatri- 
cians and psychiatrists participate 
through agencies in adoption pro- 
grams.54 At least physicians should be 
aware of the adoption process. They 
should be encouraged to make use of 
community resources, such as social 
service agencies and social service de- 
partments of hospitals, so they will be 
enabled to make more enlightened de- 
cisions that may react beneficially on 
other decision-makers in the commu- 
nity. 
54 Samuel Karelitz, M.D., "The Role of Phy- 
sicians and Hospitals in Adoptions in the United 
States," Rocky Mountain Medical Journal, LIV 
(August, 1957), 793-99. 
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RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
The influence of religion as a value 
and religious institutions as decision- 
makers in the adoption process is mani- 
fested in a number of ways. Child wel- 
fare agencies use "religion" as a factor 
in the placement of children. This is 
consistent with the philosophy in social 
work that all aspects of the lives of peo- 
ple, including the spiritual phase if that 
is important and meaningful to them, 
should be enhanced.55 The Child Wel- 
fare League of America Standards tates 
the position to which many non-sec- 
tarian agencies adhere: 
A child should ordinarily be placed in a 
home where the religion of adoptive parents 
is the same as that of the child, unless the 
parents have specified that the child should 
be placed with a family of another religion. 
Every effort (including interagency and 
interstate referrals) should be made to place 
the child within its own faith, or that desig- 
nated by his parents. If however such match- 
ing means that placement might never be 
feasible, or involves a substantial delay in 
placement or placement in a less suitable 
home, a child's need for a permanent family 
of his own requires that consideration should 
then be given to placing the child in a home 
of a different religion. For children whose 
religion is not known, and whose parents are 
not accessible, the most suitable home avail- 
able should be selected.56 
The method of assigning adoptable 
children to the agency under the aus- 
pices of the church of which the natural 
mother or the child is a member, a prac- 
tice common in many communities, is 
an early commitment o religion as a 
value to be enhanced in the social proc- 
ess of adoption, and it reflects the im- 
portance of religious institutions as de- 
a See Sue W. Spencer, "What Place Has Religion 
in Social Work Education?" Social Service Review, 
XXXV (June, 1961), 168. 
68 Child Welfare League of America, op. cit., 
p. 25. 
cision-makers. This commitment o re- 
ligion as a value to be promoted is per- 
petuated by sectarian child welfare 
agencies that require the placement of 
children in the homes of parents with 
the same religious affiliation as the 
agency. In a survey made of selected 
Catholic adoption agencies, it was re- 
ported: 
Three out of every five agencies, including 
two of every three large ones, replied that 
they sometimes place a child in a family 
where one of the parents is non-Catholic. 
This is done in instances where the mother 
is Catholic or in families in which the non- 
Catholic party is willing to take instructions 
in the fundamental teachings of the Catholic 
Church. On the whole, however, the agencies 
seek to use adoptive couples both of whom 
are Catholic.57 
Jewish and Protestant agencies also use, 
in various degrees, religion as an im- 
portant placement factor.58 
References to "religion" in adoption 
statutes reflect the legislature's regard 
for that value. In some statutes the con- 
cern for "religion" is indirectly ex- 
pressed by requiring that the petition 
for adoption must contain the religious 
affiliations of the parties involved,59 or 
by requiring that "religion" must be 
considered in the investigative report.60 
57 National Conference of CathoUc Charities, 
Adoption Practices in Catholic Agencies (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: The Conference, 19S7), p. 50. 
58 See Abraham G. Duker, "Jewish Attitudes to 
Child Adoption," and Charles G. Chakerian, "The 
Religious Component in Adoption: A Protestant 
Appraisal," in Schapiro, op. cit., II, 134-50,119-29. 
59 E.g., D.C. Code Ann. SS 16-214(4) to -214(5) 
(1961) (the petition must state the race and re- 
ligion of the child or his natural parents, and that 
of the petitioner); Iowa Code Ann. S 600.1 (Supp. 
1962) (the petition shall state the race and religious 
faith as nearly as may be of the petitioner or peti- 
tioners and of the child). 
60 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 5 45-63 (Supp. 
1961) (the preadoption report should indicate the 
religion of the child and that of his natural and 
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There seems to be a direct concern for 
the value in those states that require 
that "religion" be considered in the dis- 
position of the case.61 In either situa- 
tion, the result is to influence the judge 
in his decision. 
To write of adoption that it is a juri- 
dical act creating certain civil relations 
between two persons is to state a con- 
clusion rather than a description. Adop- 
tion is not an act; it is a process. Many 
people and institutions have partici- 
pated in this process by the time a final 
decree of adoption is granted by a 
court. The decisions that have been 
made comprise not only the readily 
identifiable ones of, for example, the 
natural mother's decision to place the 
child with a particular family, the deci- 
sion of the court staff to recommend the 
adoption through its social-investigation 
report, the decision of the judge to ap- 
adoptive parents); Ga. Code Ann. 5 74-411 (Supp. 
1961) (suitability of racial and religious affiliations 
must be investigated); 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, S 9.1-6 
(1959) (the religious faith of the petitioners, if 
ascertainable shall be a part of the investigation); 
Mich. Stat. Ann. 5 27.3178(545) (e) (Supp. 1959) 
(preadoption investigation must consider the racial 
and religious backgrounds of the child and the peti- 
tioner); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 461:2 (Supp. 
1961) (preadoption investigation is to give due 
regard to the respective race and religion of the 
child and the petitioner); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
S 3107.05(e) (p. 1960) (religious and racial back- 
grounds of child and petitioner must be investi- 
gated prior to the adoption); Wash. Rev. Code 
5 26.32.090 (Supp. 1958) (preadoption investiga- 
tion report must indicate the religion of the child). 
61 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 4-1-7 (f) (Supp. 
1960); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, 5 5B (1958); 
N.Y. Const., art. VI, S 18; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
SH13, 117; N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law S 373(3); 
N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act 5 88; R.I. Gen. Laws 
Ann. S 15-7-12 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. 5 48.82(3) 
(1957). 
prove the adoption, but also include 
other less obvious ones throughout the 
process. The other decision-makers may 
be less dramatic, but their impact is no 
less important. If, therefore, there are 
to be effective and meaningful discus- 
sions about the adoption process, wheth- 
er the purpose of these discussions is 
to evaluate, reform, or revise the proc- 
ess, the participation of these people is 
necessary. 
There is a noticeable promotion of 
values in the adoption process. To sug- 
gest that enhancing "the best interests 
of the child" is the goal in adoption 
clouds what is really occurring. It is im- 
portant to realize that values are pro- 
moted and to question whether these 
values are either meaningful or proper 
in establishing a parent-child relation- 
ship. Once the policies are ascertained, 
the entire adoption process should be 
designed to protect, foster, and develop 
these social values. An attempt has been 
made to indicate that it is consistent 
with promoting the welfare and well- 
being (values generally accepted as vi- 
tal in the process) of the child and of 
his natural and adoptive parents for the 
state to control the reorganization of a 
family. It is also consistent with this 
policy to have a child represented by 
counsel in a dispute regarding the reor- 
ganization of his family relationships. 
Questions have been raised about social 
welfare agencies' imposing some values 
on applicants or encouraging other val- 
ues which may be in conflict with those 
held by some members of the commu- 
nity. These are questions for investiga- 
tion and thought by interested commu- 
nity decision-makers. 
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